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PATCHING OLD WINESKINS: HEIGHTENED 
DEFERENCE TOWARDS SAIBAN-IN FINDINGS OF FACT 
ON KOSO APPEAL IS NOT ENOUGH  
 
Caleb Jon F. Vandenbos † 
 
Abstract: The successful introduction of the saiban-in seido—the Japanese lay 
assessor system—was a tremendous step towards creating meaningful exchange between 
the public and the judiciary and democratizing the criminal justice system in Japan.  To 
preserve the quality of this exchange, judges must conscientiously solicit and respect lay 
assessor input during deliberations, and saiban-in decisions must retain their force on 
appeal.  Under current appellate procedure, however, saiban-in findings of fact may be 
replaced on koso appeal.  Koso appeals threaten to eviscerate lay participants’ 
contributions in the individual case being reviewed and, in the long term, will discourage 
judges from taking lay assessors’ contributions seriously during jury deliberations.   
Although the Supreme Court of Japan has affirmed the unique capacity of saiban-in 
panels to assess credibility and make factual determinations, a 2012 Supreme Court 
decision threatened the panels’ responsibility by failing to impose a higher standard of 
review for reviewing the factual findings of saiban-in trials.  Even if it had adopted a 
higher standard, such standards are subject to erosion over time as judges apply them in 
individual cases.  To ensure the vitality of the saiban-in’s contribution to the Japanese 
criminal justice system, the Supreme Court of Japan should eliminate koso appeals 
courts’ ability to replace saiban-in findings of fact on appeal. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“[N]o one puts new wine into old wineskins; or else the new wine 
bursts the wineskins, the wine is spilled, and the wineskins are ruined.  But 
new wine must be put into new wineskins.”1  
 
The reforms that took place at the turn of the millennium in Japan 
have been described as equal in significance to those of the Meiji 
Restoration and the Occupation.2  Arguably, the crowning achievement of 
these reforms was the saiban-in seido—the Japanese lay assessor system—
whereby laypersons are selected randomly from the public to sit on panels 
with professional judges to decide criminal cases.  The saiban-in seido has 
                                                      
†  The author would like to thank Professors John Haley and Daniel Foote for their comments and 
support while drafting. 
1  Mark 2:22 (King James). 
2  Setsuo Miyazawa, Successes, Failures, and Remaining Issues of the Justice System Reform in 
Japan: An Introduction to the Symposium Issue, 36 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 313, 314 (2013) 
(“[T]he recommendations of the [Justice System Reform Council] were so comprehensive that they could 
be considered as the third major series of reforms of the modern legal system in Japan, following the first 
wave of major reforms in the late 19th century and the second major wave of reforms introduced after 
World War II.”).  
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certainly been the most visible of the millennium reforms.3  Although the 
saiban-in is new, the appellate procedure into which it is placed is old. 
Pouring the new wine of lay participation into the old wineskins of pre-
saiban-in appellate procedure threatens to undermine the saiban-in’s 
influence and to spoil the contribution it was intended to make. 
Part II of this comment briefly reviews the millennium reforms, and 
the historical and spiritual significance of the saiban-in seido.  Part III 
describes current appellate procedure in Japan, and explains why the 
capacity of appellate judges to replace facts on appeal threatens to 
compromise the goals behind the saiban-in.  Part IV reviews a Supreme 
Court of Japan decision that indicates a move toward establishing a 
heightened standard of review for saiban-in findings.  Part V of this 
comment argues that even if the Court were to institute a heightened 
standard for saiban-in findings, this protection would still not be sufficient 
to protect lay participants’ contributions.  Instead, the Court should move 
strongly to protect saiban-in input, and end the appellate practice that allows 
judges to replace facts on appellate review. 
II. THE SAIBAN-IN SEIDO AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE TO DEMOCRATIC IDEALS 
A.  The Saiban-in Seido 
Responding to a perceived need to improve the quality of justice in 
Japan, the Japanese Diet4 introduced the saiban-in seido—or lay assessor 
system—into the criminal justice system in 2004; it went into effect in 
2009.5  The saiban-in seido is a system of joint decision making,6 whereby 
professional judges and laypersons together find facts and determine the 
sentence of a criminal defendant. 7   Only in cases involving crimes 
punishable by death or indefinite imprisonment, or in cases in which a 
victim has died, is the saiban-in mandated under the system.8  The saiban-in 
                                                      
3  See Daniel H. Foote, Citizen Participation: Appraising the Saiban’in System, 22 MICH. ST. INT’L. 
L. REV. 755, 756 (2014). 
4  While the Japanese Diet is made up of an upper and lower house, called the House of 
Representatives and the House of Councilors, respectively, this comment will refer to them collectively as 
“the Diet” or “the Japanese Diet.”  See Relationship to Other Bodies, HOUSE OF COUNCILLORS, THE 
NATIONAL DIET OF JAPAN, available at www.sanglin.go.jp/eng/guide/relation/index.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 
2015). 
5  See John O. Haley, Japan, in THE HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW 393, 398 (Kevin 
Jon Heller & Markus D. Dubber eds., 2011). 
6 1 Saiban’in no sanka suru keiji saiban ni kansuru horitsu, Law No. 63 of 2004, translated in Kent 
Anderson & Emma Saint, Japan’s Quasi-Jury (Saiban-in) Law: An Annotated Translation of the Act 
Concerning Participation of Lay Assessors in Criminal Trials, 6 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 233, 233 (2005). 
7  See id. at 240-41, art. 6. 
8  See id. at 236-38, art. 2(1)(i), (ii). 
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system borrows features of European and Anglo-American criminal justice 
models, but is not identical to any other system in the world.9  
In most circumstances, saiban-in panels are made up of three judges 
and six lay assessors.10  Saiban-in members are randomly selected from the 
voting population,11 and may be subject to dismissal for specific reasons.12  
Like professional judges, lay participants may ask questions of witnesses,13 
victims,14 and the defendant.15  To secure a guilty verdict, a simple majority 
that includes at least one lay assessor and one judge is necessary.16  The 
same majority is sufficient for determining a sentence, except in cases where 
the majority does not include both a lay assessor and a professional judge.  
In such a situation, the vote most unfavorable to the defendant is counted 
with the next most unfavorable until such a majority is reached.17  The chief 
judge manages the panel during proceedings.  She must update and educate 
lay assessors on legal rulings or court procedural decisions.18  In addition, 
she must “conscientiously explain[] the necessary laws or ordinances to the 
lay assessors, making arrangements so that deliberations are easily 
understandable . . . [and] provid[e] sufficient opportunity for the lay 
assessors to voice their opinions . . . so that lay assessors are sufficiently able 
to execute their duties.”19  Lay assessors, as well as judges, are ‘entrusted’ to 
freely decide the issues before them “based on the strength of the 
evidence.”20  However, they are prohibited from disclosing ‘secrets’ learned 
during deliberations.21  Further, they may not disclose ‘the particulars’ they 
are “allowed to hear, or the opinions of any of the panelists and who voiced 
them.”22  The lay assessors may be punished for disclosing such secrets.23 
                                                      
9  See id. at 234. 
10  See id. at 237, art. 2(2).  There is an exception.  A panel may consist of only one judge and four 
assessors if the court “decide[s] that it is appropriate” and there is “no dispute concerning the facts.”  Id. at 
237, art. 3.  To date, there has been no saiban-in trials where such a ratio was employed.  
11  See id. at 243, art. 13. 
12  See id. at 256-57, 260-62, art. 34, 41.  
13  See id. at 267, art. 56-57.  
14  See id. at 268, art. 58. 
15  See id. at 268, art. 59. 
16  See id. at 273, art. 67(1). 
17  See id. at 273, art. 67(2) (“[T]he number of opinions for the option most unfavorable to the 
defendant will be added to the number of opinions for the next favorable option, until a majority opinion of 
the members of the judicial panel which includes both an empanelled judge and a lay assessor holding that 
opinion is achieved.”).  
18  See id. at 273, art. 66(3). 
19  Id. at 273, art. 66(5). 
20  Id. at 268-269, art. 62. 
21  See id. at 242, art. 9(2). 
22  Id. at 274-75, art. 70. 
23  Id. at 277-78, art. 79. 
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B.  The Saiban-in is Significant to Democratic Ideals Because it Was 
 Introduced in Response to the Opacity of the Justice System  
The introduction of the saiban-in seido was, and continues to be, 
greatly significant to democratic ideals in Japan.  This significance likely 
does not stem from its potential and actual effects on individual defendants 
alone.  Instead, the saiban-in’s significance stems from what it symbolizes: a 
democratic solution to the opacity of criminal justice in Japan, and the 
triumphal return of lay participation after the failure of the pre-World War II 
jury system.  
Prior to the millennial reforms, Japanese law scholar Ryuichi Hirano 
made his now famous statement that “[t]he Japanese criminal justice system 
is rather hopeless.”24  At the time of his statement, criminal processes in 
Japan had long been criticized.  Although formally adversarial, Japan’s 
criminal procedure has followed its European heritage closely25 and was—at 
least until the introduction of the saiban-in—predominantly inquisitorial.26  
Criminal trials were heavily document-based,27 contributing to the criticism 
that the Japanese trial was “trial by dossier.”28  This dossier was assembled 
by the prosecutor’s office—a major actor in both criminal prosecution and 
investigation in Japan29—while defense counsel played little, if any, role in 
its assembly.30  Confessions were (and still are) extracted from defendants 
kept for interrogation for long periods of time prior to arrest,31 and evidence 
of guilt weighs heavily on such confessions.32  Typical of the system’s 
reliance on documents, these confessions were presented to the court as 
summaries written by the investigator.33  Ninety percent of cases in Japan 
involve a confession,34 and although persons are presumed innocent,35 the 
                                                      
24  Ryuichi Hirano, Genko keijisosho no shindan [Diagnosis of Current Criminal Procedure], in 
DANDO SHIGEMITSU HAKUSHI KOKI SHUKUGA RONBUNSH [COLLECTION OF WORKS TO COMMEMORATE 
THE SEVENTIETH BIRTHDAY OF DR. SHIGEMITSU DANDO] 407, 407 (Yasuhara Hiraba et al. eds., 1985), 
translated in 22 LAW IN JAPAN 129, 129 (1989). 
25  The Japanese legal system has long been influenced by continental models.  See Haley, supra note 
5, at 394; see also Arne F. Soldwedel, Testing Japan’s Convictions: The Lay Judge System and the Rights 
of Criminal Defendants, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1417, 1423 (2008) (discussing how the lay judge 
system is heavily modeled on European mixed jury or lay judge systems). 
26  See Haley, supra note 5, at 397-98. 
27  CARL F. GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN 479 (3rd ed. 2012); Lester W. Kiss, Reviving the 
Criminal Jury in Japan, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 261, 265 (1999).   
28  Kiss, supra note 27.   
29  See David T. Johnson, Japan’s Prosecution System, 41 CRIME & JUST. 35, 52 (2012). 
30  GOODMAN, supra note 27, at 477. 
31  Id. at 467. 
32  Johnson, supra note 29, at 52. 
33  GOODMAN, supra note 27, at 489. 
34  Matthew J. Wilson, Japan’s New Criminal Jury Trial System: In Need of More Transparency, 
More Access, and More Time, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 487, 509 (2010). 
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conviction rate is still 93 to 98 percent for contested cases. 36   This 
predictability elicited criticism that the Japanese criminal trial was a ritual 
matter in which the court merely confirmed the prosecutor’s determination 
of guilt by reviewing the prosecutor’s dossier.37  
The millennial reforms aimed to alleviate the obscurity 38 —and 
sometimes secrecy39—of the criminal justice system to the public.  This 
obscurity has been perpetuated, at least in part, by the veiled and cloistered 
existence of one of the trial court’s key figures: the judge.  Prior to the 
introduction of the saiban-in, professional judges were the sole arbiters of 
guilt and sentencing in all cases.40  One reason for having career judges 
arbitrate facts and sentences was conformity between judgments,41 and Japan 
does enjoy “a high degree of nationwide consistency in adjudication.”42 
Judges undergo a rigorous legal training 43  meant to produce ethical, 
professional, and elite civil servants who will work hard and remain 
independent.44  Judges graduate from undergraduate law programs, and go 
through the Legal Research and Training Institute.45  Most judges graduate 
from elite schools, and spend their lives thereafter working alongside fellow 
judges until retirement at age sixty.46  However, while this training works to 
produce a judiciary that is “by all reliable accounts . . . the most 
                                                                                                                                                                 
35  See Haley, supra note 5, at 397. 
36  See Johnson, supra note 29, at 48.  
37  See GOODMAN, supra note 27, at 479; see also Daniel H. Foote, The Benevolent Paternalism of 
Japanese Criminal Justice, 80 CAL. L. REV. 317, 338-39 (1992). 
38  Consider prosecution review commissions, whereby laypersons check the prosecutor’s decision 
not to prosecute.  See, e.g., Mark D. West, Prosecution Review Commissions: Japan’s Answer to the 
Problem of Prosecutorial Discretion, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 684, 700 (1992) (“Prosecution review 
commissions remained virtually unknown in Japan through the late 1980s . . . [O]ne Nagasaki woman who 
received a notice for ‘jury duty’ was so frightened to receive something from what she assumed to be the 
prosecutor’s office that she committed suicide on the spot by drinking herbicide.”). 
39  Consider, for example, the death penalty.  After a random questioning of thirty Japanese citizens, 
one expert wrote that “[s]everal did not know that death is delivered by hanging in Japan (a 
misunderstanding I encountered in numerous other conversations), and most knew nothing about the social 
isolation that surrounds inmates on Japan’s death row.”  David T. Johnson, Japan’s Secretive Death 
Penalty Policy: Contours, Origins, Justifications, and Meanings, 7 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 62, 115 
(2006).  
40  Joseph J. Kodner, Re-Introducing Lay Participation to Japanese Criminal Cases: An Awkward Yet 
Necessary Step, 2 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV.  231, 236 (2003). 
41  Id. at 237. 
42  Haley, supra note 5, at 397.  
43  See id. at 396; see also Overview of the Judicial System in Japan, Judges of the Lower Courts, 
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judicial_sys/overview_of/overview/index.html#08 (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2015). 
44  John O. Haley, Litigation in Japan: A New Look at Old Problems, 10 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & 
DISP. RESOL. 121, 139 (2002).  
45  J. Mark Ramseyer, Who Hangs Whom for What? The Death Penalty in Japan, 4 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 365, 372-73 (2012).  
46  Id. 
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autonomous, corruption-free and trusted judiciary in the world,”47 it also 
obscures the criminal process from the public, and weakens the connection 
between the justice system and the people.  In fact, one of the goals of the 
Japanese Federation of Bar Association (“JFBA”) for the millennium 
reforms was to counter this weakening by introducing lay participation into 
the justice system.  By introducing lay participation, the bar association 
sought to ensure respect for the presumption of innocence and the reasonable 
doubt standard in the courtroom.48 
The Japanese criminal justice system’s failures were made apparent to 
the public with a series of false convictions that came to light between 1983 
and 1989.  During this time, four famous death row inmates were recognized 
as wrongfully accused and convicted and were subsequently exonerated.49  
The prosecutions of all four used confessions that had been coerced from the 
accused during long interrogations.50  Prior to their exonerations, the victims 
had spent between twenty-eight to thirty-three years in prison, many on 
death row.51  These cases may have helped to bring the issue of false 
confessions to the public eye,52 and caused justice officials to begin thinking 
about structural change.53  
C.  The Process by Which the Saibain-in was Introduced, the History of 
 Lay Participation, and the Public’s Interest in the Saibain-in 
 Demonstrates its Significance to Democratic Ideals 
The Japanese justice system’s opacity prompted calls for lay 
participation before the 1990s,54 but the false convictions of the 1980s—
combined with political influences that existed in the late 1990s—created 
“the serendipity of events”55 that led the JFBA to propose comprehensive 
                                                      
47  Haley, supra note 44. 
48  Foote, supra note 3, at 758 (“For the organized bar, key objectives [to introducing the lay assessor 
system] were achieving true respect for the presumption of innocence and the reasonable doubt standard 
and preventing miscarriages of justice.”).  
49  Kazuko Ito, Wrongful Convictions and Recent Criminal Justice Reform in Japan, 80 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1245, 1254 (2012).  
50  Id. 
51  Id.  
52  GOODMAN, supra note 27, at 461. 
53  Daniel H. Foote, From Japan’s Death Row to Freedom, 1 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 11, 13 (1992).  
54  For an excellent and thorough review of the events leading up to the reforms, see Setsuo 
Miyazawa, supra note 2, at 313-14; see also Kent Anderson & Mark Nolan, Lay Participation in the 
Japanese Justice System: A Few Preliminary Thoughts Regarding the Lay Assessor System (Saiban-in 
Seido) from Domestic Historical and International Psychological Perspectives, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
935, 939 (2004). 
55  Anderson & Nolan, supra note 54, at 939. 
APRIL 2015 PATCHING OLD WINESKINS  397 
 
judicial reform in 1999.56  The Japanese Diet passed the Act to Establish the 
Justice System Reform Council (“JSRC”) on June 30, 1999,57 and the JSRC 
eventually published findings recommending lay participation in trials, 
leading to the establishment of the saiban-in seido. 
The saiban-in seido is significant to democratic ideals in great part 
because of the democratic process by which the JSRC was formed.  The 
JSRC was established independently from the dominant forces of the justice 
system—the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court, and the JFBA.58  
Instead it was established directly under the Cabinet.59  In fact, the JSRC 
was made up predominantly of laypersons.  In addition to a former chief 
judge, former prosecutor, and former JFBA president, the JSRC’s members 
included three law professors, two business people, the president of a 
university federation, a professor of accounting, the president of the Nippon 
Foundation, a representative from the largest labor organization in Japan, a 
representative from a consumer organization, and a novelist. 60   The 
deliberations were open to the public, and individuals could voice their 
opinions to the panel.61  The success of the JSRC’s recommendations was “a 
major achievement”62 because it was “the first time that major reforms [had 
been] successfully proposed by a government committee as national 
policies.”63  
The government imposed lofty goals on the JSRC.  In addition to 
“clarifying the role to be played by justice in Japanese society in the 21st 
century,”64 the JSRC was to examine and deliberate on reforms to effect a 
justice system that was “easy for the people to utilize,”65 that included some 
manner of public participation, and was optimized to “achieve [the] legal 
profession as it should be.”66  After two years of deliberations, the JSRC 
published its recommendations for reform in 2001.67  
                                                      
56  Kazuko Ito, supra note 49 at 1256-57.  
57  Setsuo Miyazawa, supra note 2, at 317.  
58  Id. at 313-14.  
59  JUSTICE SYS. REFORM COUNCIL, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL - 
FOR A JUSTICE SYSTEM TO SUPPORT JAPAN IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2001), available at 
http://japan.kantei.go.jp/judiciary/2001/0612report.html. 
60  Setsuo Miyazawa, supra note 2, at 317.  
61  Id. at 318. 
62  Id. at 326. 
63  Id. 
64  JUSTICE SYS. REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 59 (citing Shihō kaikaku shingi-kai secchi hō [Act on 
the Establishment of the Justice System Reform Council] Law no. 68/1999) (Japan)). 
65  Id. 
66  Id. 
67  See Setsuo Miyazawa, supra note 2, at 320.  
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The JSRC described its recommendations as part of a process by 
which the fundamental ethic of Japanese self-government was to be changed 
for the better: 
 
Japan, which is facing difficult conditions, has been working on 
various reforms, including political reform, administrative 
reform, promotion of decentralization, and reforms of the 
economic structure such as deregulation.  What commonly 
underlies these reforms is the will that each and every person 
will break out of the consciousness of being a governed object 
and will become a governing subject, with autonomy and 
bearing social responsibility, and that the people will participate 
in building a free and fair society in mutual cooperation and 
will work to restore rich creativity and vitality to this country.  
This reform of the justice system aims to tie these various 
reforms together organically.68  
 
The JSRC saw the role of the people in self-governance as essential: 
 
The people, who are the governing subjects . . . must participate 
in the administration of justice[,] . . . must . . . maintain places 
for rich communication with the legal profession, and must 
themselves realize and support the justice system for the 
people.  For justice to achieve the role demanded of it[,] . . . 
broad popular support . . . [is] necessary . . . . [T]he judicial 
branch must establish a popular base by meeting the demand 
for accountability to the people.69 
 
It was under the heading “Establishment of the Popular Base of the Justice 
System” that the JSRC explained the need for lay participation at trial: 
 
[I]t is incumbent on the people to break out of the excessive 
dependency on the state that accompanies the traditional 
consciousness of being governed objects . . . . In the field of the 
judiciary which plays an integral part . . . of the existing 
                                                      
68  JUSTICE SYS. REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 59. 
69  Id. at 131. 
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governance structure based on popular sovereignty, the people 
also are expected to participate broadly.70 
 
Under the same section, the JSRC proposed the saiban-in seido, stating: 
 
[P]opular participation in [litigation] proceedings has very 
important significance as a measure to establish the popular 
base of the justice system . . . . [T]hrough having the people 
participate in the trial process, and through having the sound 
social common sense of the public reflected more directly in 
trial decisions, the people’s understanding and support of the 
justice system will deepen and it will be possible for the justice 
system to achieve a firmer popular base . . . .  [A] new system 
should be introduced . . . enabling the broad general public to 
cooperate with judges by sharing responsibilities, and to take 
part autonomously and meaningfully in deciding trials.71 
 
When the JSRC published its recommendations, it seemed that the 
introduction of lay participation was “a forgone outcome.”72  Ultimate 
responsibility for the implementation of the saiban-in seido was delegated to 
the Lay Assessor/Penal Matters Study Investigation Committee (“the 
Investigation Committee”).73  By 2004, the Investigation Committee had 
finished its work and the Japanese Diet enacted the Act Concerning 
Participation of Lay Assessors in Criminal Trials.74  In 2009, the first 
saiban-in trial took place.75  
The saiban-in was a central tenant of the reforms, more so than most 
other parts of the JSRC’s recommendations.  The JSRC’s recommendations 
were meant to revitalize the criminal justice system by many means—
including the introduction of post-graduate law schools, the relaxation of 
standards for passing the bar, and the endowment of then-existing lay person 
prosecution review commissions that were not only able to recommend, but 
also compel prosecution, and the expansion of access to legal services for 
the public.76  In the eyes of the JSRC, however, the saiban-in was one of 
                                                      
70  Id. at 211. 
71  Id. at 213. 
72  Anderson & Nolan, supra note 54, at 940.  
73  Id.  
74  See Douglas G. Levin, Saiban-in-Seido: Lost in Translation? How the Source of Power 
Underlying Japan's Proposed Lay Assessor System May Determine Its Fate, 10 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 
199, 200 (2008). 
75  See Foote, supra note 3, at 756.  
76  See JUSTICE SYS. REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 59. 
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“the three pillars of [the] reform.”77  However, given the other factors that 
relate to the introduction of the saiban-in system, its importance is likely 
even greater than stated by the JSRC. 
In addition to the saiban-in’s central place in the JSRC’s efforts to 
“establish[] the popular base of the justice system,” historical factors make 
the saiban-in seido immensely significant.  The saiban-in seido is not the 
first attempt to introduce lay participation into criminal trials in Japan.  The 
Japanese criminal justice system employed juries in 1928, 78  but juries 
became defunct due to lack of use and were officially suspended in 1943.79  
For many years afterward, reformers unsuccessfully called for the 
reintroduction of a jury system.80  However, in an attempt to curtail the 
judicial tendency to rubber stamp criminal convictions, lay participation was 
reintroduced to the Japanese court system in 2009. 81   Layperson 
participation was reintroduced to the system in the hope that laypersons 
would not be biased by daily work with prosecutors and would therefore be 
better able to apply the presumption of innocence. 82   Indeed, these 
aspirations were justified based on previous experience.  The acquittal rate 
by pre-WWII juries was 15.4 percent, while the acquittal rate of pre-WWII 
professional judges was 1.3 percent to 3.7 percent. 83   The recently 
introduced saiban-in seido has not attained the degree of disparity between 
saiban-in outcomes and the outcomes of professional judge-made panels at 
this stage in its development.  However, the success of the JSRC’s initial call 
for the reintroduction of laypersons to the court system—sixty-six years 
after the pre-war jury was discontinued in 194384—was itself momentous. 
Finally, the introduction of the saiban-in seido was also significant to 
the Japanese public.  The extensive media coverage the saiban-in received 
demonstrates this significance.85  The public was highly interested in this 
                                                      
77  Id. at 212. 
78  See Levin, supra note 74, at 203.  
79  See Anderson & Nolan, supra note 54, at 962.  
80  Kiss, supra note 27, at 264 (“The roots of the debate on the readoption of the jury trial . . . go far 
deeper than a mere reaction to erroneous verdicts by judges.”); see also Foote, supra note 53, at 83-84 
(“Reintroduction of the jury would have profound implications for criminal trials in Japan. Live witnesses 
presumably would replace the heavy reliance on written witness statements, and questioning of the 
defendant likely would take on greater formality.”). 
81  See Kiss, supra note 27, at 264. 
82  See Foote, supra note 53, at 84. 
83  See id. 
84  See David Johnson, Early Returns from Japan’s New Criminal Trials, THE ASIA-PACIFIC 
JOURNAL: JAPAN FOCUS (2009), available at http://www.japanfocus.org/-David_T_-Johnson/3212. 
85  See Setsuo Miyazawa, supra note 2, at 326; see also Foote, supra note 3, at 756.  For examples of 
media coverage, see Setsuko Kamiya, Jury System for Criminal Trials Urged, THE JAPAN TIMES (Dec. 12, 
1999), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/1999/12/21/national/jury-system-for-criminal-trials-urged; Panel 
Calls for Juries in Criminal Trials, THE JAPAN TIMES (Sept. 19, 2000), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/ 
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reform because it could affect every person.86  In order to help citizens and 
judges prepare for the change, pamphlets, videos, and mock trials were made 
available,87 and surveys were sent out to test the public’s willingness to 
perform its duty.88  However, not all coverage was positive.89  In conclusion, 
saiban-in’s historical significance, the media (and scholarly) fanfare that 
attended its introduction, and the process by which it was introduced make 
saiban-in one of the most visible, and perhaps the most significant, of the 
millennial reforms. 
D. The Saiban-in is Significant to Democratic Ideals Because it Has 
 Demonstrated its Capacity to Influence the Justice System  
While the saiban-in has democratic legitimacy and historical and 
emotive significance as a symbol of democratic progress, it has also 
demonstrated its capacity to do as it was intended: influence the justice 
system.90  The introduction of lay participation through the saiban-in has 
broken the professional judiciary and procuracy’s sole control over the 
criminal trial.  Lay participation has breathed fresh influence into the justice 
system, and brought “orality and directness” 91 to the courtroom.   
Significantly, trials are shifting away from exclusively using written witness 
statements and confessions, and are instead employing live in-court 
testimony and cross-examination.92  Attorneys now reportedly speak in more 
plain terms.93  
Presumably, these changes are ushering in better processes and results 
for defendants.  Mixed panels have not been shy to find acquittals on the 
serious cases that come before them.94  In fact, contrary to concerns that the 
                                                                                                                                                                 
2000/09/19/national/panel-calls-for-juries-in-criminal-trials; Mark Willacy, Japan Revives Jury Trials, 
ABC (Aug. 4, 2009), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2009-08-05/japan-revives-jury-trials/1379146. 
86  Justin McCurry, Trial By Jury Returns to Japan, GUARDIAN (Aug. 3, 2009), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/aug/03/japan-trial-by-jury-returns; Japan’s Landmark Jury Trial 
Ends, BBC NEWS ONLINE (Aug. 6, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8188447.stm. 
87  Norimitsu Onishi, Japan Learns Dreaded Task of Jury Duty, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/16/world/asia/16jury.html?ex=1342238400&en=e03e6e32d7b87f74&ei=
5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss&_r=0. 
88  See Foote, supra note 3, at 761.  
89 Id. at 760 (“[A]s soon as it became apparent that a system of lay participation would be introduced, 
the mass media embarked on what can only be described as a campaign of saiban’in system bashing.”).   
90  See generally, Foote, supra note 3 (reviewing the diverse and salutary effects of the saiban-in 
seido on the justice system in Japan). 
91  See id. at 773. 
92  Id. at 765.  
93  Id. at 767. 
94  Gallows Averted in a First as Lay Judges Acquit, JAPAN TIMES (Dec. 11, 2010), 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2010/12/11/national/gallows-averted-in-a-first-as-lay-judges-
acquit/#.VHv-koeDpUQ. 
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Japanese lay public would merely be more retributive than professional 
judges,95 the saiban-in has had a visible yet complex effect on sentencing.  
For example, although in murder cases “there has been modest 
increases . . . in sentences over [the past] fifteen years, there [has also] been 
an even greater increase in sentences of less than five years.”96  Additionally, 
there has been an increase in suspended sentences for several categories of 
crimes, and an increase in the use of probation officers.97  “These figures 
suggest a rather nuanced view, with harsher (by Japanese standards, at least) 
sentences imposed in some cases, but on the whole, reflect[] considerable 
faith in defendants' potential for rehabilitation.”98  Finally, the introduction 
of the saiban-in has also “provided the impetus for renewed reflection on the 
fundamental meaning and significance of the criminal justice system,”99 
encouraging the introduction of other, long-called for reforms, such as 
expanded discovery and the strengthening of the defense bar.100  It is 
heartening to see that the saiban-in seido has been making an impact, even 
in its early tenure. 
III. THE CURRENT SYSTEM GUARANTEES LAY PARTICIPATION’S SURVIVAL, 
BUT NOT ITS VITALITY 
A.  Absent Legislative Action, the Saiban-in Seido Will Continue to Exist 
As currently structured, the saiban-in seido’s survival is guaranteed 
unless the legislature intervenes.  Its success and vitality as a democratic 
influence on the judiciary and justice system, however, are not as certain.   
The saiban-in seido’s purpose is to “establish the popular base for the justice 
system”101 by allowing lay persons to “participate in the administration of 
justice autonomously and meaningfully.”102  However, the judges who work 
with the public in their courtrooms are predominantly responsible for 
ensuring the meaningfulness of this exchange, not the Japanese public.  This 
is because only about 12,000 lay assessors (including alternates) will 
deliberate each year, and these 12,000 lay assessors will only sit on one case 
per service.103  The quality of lay participants’ contribution to the judicial 
                                                      
95  See Foote, supra note 3, at 766. 
96  Id. 
97  Id.  
98  Id.  
99  Id. at 773. 
100  Id. 
101  JUSTICE SYS. REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 59. 
102  Id. 
103 See Foote, supra note 3, at 769.  
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system will depend ultimately on whether or not judges respect lay 
participants’ input during and after trial, and the effect jurors’ input has on 
career judges over the long run.  Therefore, in order for the reform to be 
successful, it is essential that judges respect layperson input.    
As a preliminary matter, there is no concern that saiban-in trials will 
fall into disuse under the current system.  Japan’s failed attempt at lay 
participation helps to assuage this concern.  Trials by jury were initially 
popular when Japan instituted its jury system in 1928.104  By 1943, jury 
usage had declined so precipitously that the institution’s influence on the 
criminal justice system was virtually non-existent.105  While the decline may 
have been attributable to the developing fascism of the pre-WWII era, this 
reason is probably not exclusive.106  Procedural factors, in addition to the 
fact that defendants could decline a jury trial, probably contributed most to 
the disuse of juries.  For example, although juries were generally more 
lenient than professional judges,107 a jury’s decision could be set aside and a 
new jury empaneled if the judge felt that the verdict was in error,108 which 
happened often.  In addition, defendants could not mitigate the sentence of a 
jury on appeal.109  These procedural features, as well as the fact that it was 
more expensive and time consuming for defense attorneys to conduct a trial 
by jury, likely contributed to juries’ unpopularity.110  This unpopularity 
would have been irrelevant if juries were mandatory for some or all cases, 
but under the pre-war system, defendants often had the right to choose to be 
tried by a judge or jury.111  
In contrast, the current saiban-in system will not suffer the same fate 
as Japan’s pre-WWII jury system because it denies defendants the right to 
choose to be tried by a saiban-in panel.112  Thus, the saiban-in is hardwired 
into the system:  as long as the prosecutor continues charging the qualifying 
crimes and the legislature does not discontinue the system, the saiban-in 
seido will live on. 
                                                      
104  See Anderson & Nolan, supra note 54, at 963 (143 were held in the first year of jury trials in 
Japan).  
105  See id. (In their final year, only two jury trials were held.).  
106  Id. (“Commentators offer a wide variety of explanations for the decline of juries; most focus on 
the effect of structural elements of the jury law and on defendants' and their legal counsels' strategic 
considerations.”). 
107  See Foote, supra note 53, at 84 (The pre-WWII jury acquittal rate was 15.4%, while a professional 
judge’s acquittal rate was between 1.3% and 3.7%.). 
108  See Kiss, supra note 27, at 268. 
109  Id. at 269. 
110  Id. 
111  Leah Ambler, The People Decide: The Effect of the Introduction of the Quasi-Jury System 
(Saiban-in Seido) on the Death Penalty in Japan, 6 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 1, 40 (2007). 
112  See Anderson & Saint, supra note 6, at 236-38, art. 2. 
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B.  Although the Saiban-in will Survive, its Enduring Vitality as a 
Democratic Influence on the Judicial System Is Less Certain  
Although making trial by saiban-in mandatory may avoid the fate of 
Japan’s original experiment in lay participation, it does nothing to avoid the 
loss of its vitality.   The possibility that Japan’s mixed panels will lose their 
vigor as potent forces of democratic influence in the judiciary—thus failing 
to fulfill their purpose of establishing democratic exchange between the 
public and the judicial system—is no idle fear.  Germany’s mixed-court 
system is similar to Japan’s system in many ways, and, despite its seventy-
year tenure, it has been criticized for providing no real exchange between lay 
participants and the judiciary. 
Japanese criminal procedure borrows heavily from German models.113  
“German law and legal science continue to exert strong influence” over 
Japan .114  The German system is predominantly inquisitional in nature. 115 
For example, German prosecution has typically been paper-based, with 
prosecutors preparing large files of evidence to be presented to a panel.116  
Accordingly, it is unsurprising that Japan’s mixed-court system bears many 
similarities to Germany’s system.117  In Germany, like Japan, “lay judges” 
sit alongside professional judges to decide guilt and sentence.118  The judge 
also has control over drafting the summary that will be given to the appellate 
court on appeal after the verdict, similar to the Japanese system. 119  
Moreover, in both systems, only professional judges can sit on appeal.120  
The similarity between Japan’s saiban-in seido system and Germany’s 
mixed court system serves as a portent of things to come for the Japanese 
system.121  The efficacy of German lay judges in affecting outcomes has 
been seriously criticized.  Critics have said that German lay judges tend to 
be passive, and few cases resolved by a mixed-court panel “necessarily 
reflect lay participation of any kind.”122  Cases tried by a mixed panel “may 
be—and most often are—decided by the professional judge or judges to 
whose authority the lay judges generally defer both at trial and during 
                                                      
113 David T. Johnson, Japan’s Prosecution System, 41 CRIME & JUST. 35, 39-40 (2012). 
114  Haley, supra note 5, at 394. 
115  Thomas Weigend, Germany, in THE HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW 252, 257 
(Kevin Jon Heller & Markus D. Dubber eds., 2011).  
116  See Kodner, supra note 40, at 247. 
117  See id. at 246. 
118  Id. at 246-47. 
119  See id. at 247; see also JUSTICE SYS. REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 59.  
120  Weigend, supra note 115, at 258. 
121  Kodner, supra note 40, at 246. 
122  Id. at 248 (quoting Markus Dirk Dubber, American Plea Bargains, German Lay Judges, and the 
Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 49 STAN. L. REV. 547, 565 (1997)). 
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deliberations.”123  This deference is so great that lay judge presence may be 
merely ‘honorary’:124 
 
[A] review of the professional literature and the popular press, 
combined with trial observations and conversations with 
professional and lay judges, prosecutors, and former judicial 
clerks, strongly suggest that German lay judges play an 
insignificant and largely symbolic role in the administration of 
criminal justice.125 
 
In fact, in most cases, “it is well known that . . . lay judges go along with 
what the professional judges suggest.”126  
 However, differences do exist between the development of the 
Japanese saiban-in system and the German lay judge system.  For example, 
German lay judges were formerly prohibited from viewing the prosecutor’s 
dossier and lay judges had to make up their minds based upon the evidence 
presented at trial alone.127  This may have created a culture of lay judge 
independence that carried through to today, despite the fact that the dossier 
is now open to lay judges.  In contrast, Japanese saiban-in members were 
never subject to this limitation, so perhaps such a culture will not develop.  
Not all the differences that exist between the two systems bode well for 
Japanese lay participation’s health, however.  German lay judges serve for 
terms of five years,128 whereas saiban-in participants only sit for one case.   
Although sitting for only one case may help prevent saiban-in duties from 
becoming routine for individual lay participants, and may keep them 
engaged with the process, it will also give professional judges the upper 
hand in every deliberation.  Unlike German lay judges, Japanese lay 
participants will not have time to develop experience with the law and the 
practices of the courtroom.  Presumably, this will prevent them from 
developing the confidence and rapport in the courtroom that would allow 
them to exchange with professional judges on more equal footing.   
In full fairness to the current saiban-in seido model, the judges who 
administer it, and the Japanese public, assessments of the deliberations by 
saiban-in participants from the last six years have been positive.  Although 
lay assessors may not discuss the inner workings of the decision-making 
                                                      
123  Id. at 247 n.114 (quoting Dubber, supra note 122, at 565). 
124  Id. at 249. 
125  Dubber, supra note 122, at 582. 
126  Weigend, supra note 115, at 258. 
127  Kodner, supra note 40, at 248. 
128  Weigend, supra note 115, at 258. 
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process129—a requirement that has not gone without criticism130—early 
assessments of the process were positive.131  Seventy percent of former 
assessors say that they were able to talk and express themselves.132  It is also 
encouraging that the judiciary seems to be enthusiastic about the saiban-in 
seido.133  Further, the fact that saiban-in panels are having an effect on 
sentencing outcomes may be seen as direct proof that the deliberators are 
genuinely considering lay assessor input.    
The novelty of the saiban-in seido creates suspicion in the long-term 
sustainability of these positive reports.  Certain features of the system have 
been criticized for disadvantaging the saiban-in’s position in relation to 
professional judges; 134  some of these features overlap with those of 
Germany’s lay judge system. 
German lay judges lost their independence and “languish in 
obscurity”135 in part because “they do not participate in the formulation and 
public announcement of the justification for the court's judgment.” 136 
Similarly, in Japan, the court announces the judgment and sentence at the 
conclusion of the deliberations,137 and the junior judge writes the opinion.138 
Although the JSRC considered the option of having saiban-in members 
participate in the publication of the opinion, 139 it ultimately decided that the 
saiban-in members should not take part in this process.  The JSRC stated 
that “[e]ven when saiban-in participate, the contents of judgments should 
fundamentally be structured in the same way as those for trials by judges 
only, and judges should prepare the judgments based on the results of the 
deliberations.” 140   Additionally, the JSRC declared it necessary that 
“judgments set forth the substantial reasons [for the judgment], so as to . . . 
obtain [the parties’ and general publics’] understanding and trust.”141  Lay 
                                                      
129 Anderson & Saint, supra note 6, art. 70. 
130 Bryan M. Thompson, Japan’s Lay Judges and Implications for Democratic Governance, THE 
RYAICHI SASAKAWA YOUNG LEADERS FELLOWSHIP FUND (May 11, 2012), http://www.tokyofoundation.or
g/sylff/9140. 
131 Setsuko Kamiya, Lay Judges Off to Solid Start, THE JAPAN TIMES (Feb. 9, 2015), 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2010/02/26/national/lay-judges-off-to-solid-start/#.VHT5voeDpUQ. 
132 Foote, supra note 3, at 767. 
133  Id. at 772.  Additionally, the judges that the author spoke with speak very highly of the system, 
and even enjoy working together with the saiban-in. 
134  See Levin, supra note 74, at 211-22. 
135  Dubber, supra note 122, at 582. 
136 Id. 
137 Anderson & Saint, supra note 6, at 241, art. 63.  
138 Ramseyer, supra note 45, at 378. 
139 Anderson & Nolan, supra note 54, at 956. 
140 JUSTICE SYS. REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 59, at 217. 
141 Id. 
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assessors need not even appear at the announcement of the judgment. 142  
Saiban-in members’ inability to participate in the drafting of the explanation 
of the judgment and sentence is concerning, especially given its similarity to 
Germany’s lay judge system.  
The fact that lay assessors cannot, under penalty of a fine, discuss 
their deliberations143 creates further concern.  Critics argue that removing 
this restriction will allow for more transparency in the deliberations in the 
future.144  These criticisms and others are not meant to suggest that Japanese 
judges will intentionally disregard lay participants’ contributions.  The 
Japanese judiciary’s integrity is widely accepted, 145  and judges seem 
enthusiastic about the changes that are happening.146  However, as the 
system becomes commonplace, and the patience and energy necessary to 
work with saiban-in on equal footing begins to counter its novelty, judges 
may be tempted to represent the contributions of lay-persons more loosely.  
By doing so, judges could get what they see as a just or reasonable result 
without being accountable to the saiban-in.  Therefore, it is imperative that 
professional judges do not come to dominate deliberations, not only in the 
immediate future, but also over the long run as the novelty and fanfare 
surrounding the new system begin to fade. 
C.  The Most Significant Threat to Meaningful Exchange Between the 
Public and the Judiciary is the Appellate Judges’ Ability to Replace 
Saiban-in Findings of Fact on Appeal 
The greatest threat to the judiciary’s long-term respect for lay-person 
input, and with it the potent force of democratic exchange between the 
public and the judiciary, is the capacity of courts to find error in, and even 
replace, saiban-in findings of fact on appeal.  This capacity to circumvent 
the saiban-in’s findings will encourage judges to take their deliberations 
with laypersons less seriously because they know that improvidently found 
facts can be re-found on appeal. 
                                                      
142 Anderson & Saint, supra note 6, at 241.    
143 JUSTICE SYS. REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 59, at art. 79. 
144 Wilson, supra note 34, at 530-31. 
145 See, e.g., Jon P. McClanahan, Citizen Participation in Japanese Criminal Trials: Reimagining the 
Right to Trial by Jury in the United States, 37 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 725, 753 (2012) (referring to 
the honesty and integrity of judges in Japan); Jessica Conser, Achievement of Judicial Effectiveness 
Through Limits on Judicial Independence: A Comparative Approach, 31 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 255, 
311 (2005). 
146 Foote, supra note 3, at 772. 
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Both the prosecution and defense have a right to appeal in Japan.147 
Appeals may be made for error in the application of law,148 error in the 
reasonableness of the sentence,149 and error in findings of fact.150  These 
appeals are called koso appeals.  Koso appeals courts may reverse a 
judgment, amend the judgment, and/or enter a new one for any such error.151 
There is no fundamental distinction between standards of review for findings 
of fact by professional judges at the trial level, or professional judges on the 
appellate level.  Appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, consider 
facts, assess credibility, and make their own factual determinations.  It is not 
uncommon for appellate courts to reverse acquittals or guilty findings.152  
Judgment 2007 (A) No. 1785 (“No. 1785”)—a case without a saiban-
in panel—demonstrates appellate judges’ ability to reverse trial level 
findings.153  In No. 1785, the defendant was accused of molesting a 17-year 
old on the morning train.154  The prosecution presented the complaining 
witnesses’ testimony, which consisted of her description of events, and her 
identification of the defendant.155  The defendant denied the molestation.156 
A panel of professional judges convicted the defendant at the trial level, and 
the court of appeals affirmed.157  The Supreme Court of Japan reviewed the 
evidence under Article 317 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which 
requires that “facts shall be found on the basis of evidence,” 158  and 
concluded that the appellate court had erred.   The Supreme Court did not 
accept the credibility determination of the prior two panels and, contrary to 
the trial court, found that: 
                                                      
147 KEIS SOSHŌHŌ [KEISOHŌ] [C. CRIM. PRO.] 2007, art. 351 (Japan) available at 
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?ft=3&re=02&dn=1&ia=03&x=37&y=18&bu=16&ky
=&page=8. 
148  Id. at art. 380. 
149  Id. at art. 381. 
150  Id. at art. 382. 
151  Id. at art. 397; see, e.g., Saikō Saibanshō [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 13, 2012, 2011 (A) 757, 66 SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHŌ KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] sec. II.1, available at http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/ 
detail?id=1142 (stating that the court cannot render a heavier sentence than the trial court did); id. art. 402, 
452. 
152 White Paper On Crime 2012, JAPANESE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, available at 
http://hakusyo1.moj.go.jp/en/61/nfm/n_61_2_2_3_4_0.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2015). 
153  For a judgment concerning what method the final appellate court should apply when reviewing 
assertions of errors in fact finding, see Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 14, 2009, 2007 (A) no. 1785, 63 
SAIKŌ SAIBANSHŌ KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ], available at http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/ 
detail?id=995.  
154  Id. at sec. I.   
155  Id. at sec. II.2-3. 
156  Id. at sec. II.2-3, 5. 
157  Id. at sec. I. 
158  KEIS SOSHŌHŌ [KEISŌHŌ] [C. CRIM. PRO.] 2007, art. 317 (Japan), available at 
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?ft=3&re=02&dn=1&ia=03&x=37&y=18&bu=16&ky
=&page=6. 
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[A]lthough the acts of molestation . . . alleged to have suffered 
were considerably persistent and serious, [the complaining 
witness] did not take any active action to avoid such acts within 
the train, such behavior of [the complaining witness] does not 
seem to be exactly consistent with [the complaining witness’] 
active action to condemn the accused as described [earlier in the 
testimony], and it was unnatural for [the complaining witness] 
to have got off the train . . . but then returned.159 
 
This opinion drew two dissents, including Justice Yukio Horigome’s, which 
emphasized that the Supreme Court makes its decisions based only on 
documentary evidence, in contrast to the trial court, which has the 
opportunity to observe the witnesses in person.160  Nonetheless, the Court 
ultimately concluded that “there [was] still room for doubt about the 
credibility of [the complaining witness’] statements concerning the acts of 
molestation that she alleged to have suffered,” and pronounced the defendant 
not guilty.161  Courts of appeal are no less willing to reverse acquittals and 
render guilty verdicts than they are to reverse guilty verdicts and render 
acquittals.162  
The process by which professional judges find facts on appeal has 
been described in terms similar to de novo review by Justice Yu Shiraki of 
the Supreme Court of Japan: 
 
[I]n many cases, the court of second instance for criminal cases 
(koso appeals court), in the course of making reviews, seemed 
to have first made its own determination with regard to the fact 
findings or sentencing based on the records . . . then compared 
its determination with the findings and sentencing made in the 
judgment in first instance (the trial court), and changed the 
latter if there were any differences, in line with its own 
determination.   Although this style of making reviews might be 
considerably different from what was originally intended, it fit 
with the intent of the parties . . . and thus has been well-
                                                      
159  See Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 14, 2009, 2007 (A) no. 1785, 63 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHŌ KEIJI 
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ], available at http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=995, at sec. II.5. 
160  See id. (Jorigome, J., dissenting).  
161  See id. at sec. II.5. 
162  See, e.g., Saikō Saibanshō [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 16, 2013, 2012 (A) no. 167, 67 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHŌ KEIJI 
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ], available at http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=1195.  
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established.163 
 
Japanese appellate courts’ willingness and ability to review and replace both 
guilty verdicts and acquittals from the trial level may shock the American 
trained lawyer as violating the province of the jury and double jeopardy.164  
However, the ability of judges to review and find new facts on appeal is 
common in civil law jurisdictions.  For example, the same is true in 
Germany, although Germany does require a retrial to find new facts.165  This 
difference between civil law nations and the common law influenced by the 
United States is understandable given the traditional nature of civil law trials.   
Further, the trial court has no special advantage in finding facts due to the 
absence of lay participants’ input and the fact that no professional judge can 
claim special competence to determine facts over any other professional 
judge.  In the absence of lay participation and the court’s reliance on paper 
files to make a determination under traditional civil law models, both trial 
and appellate level judges are equally competent to find facts. 
With the introduction of lay participation into criminal trials, however, 
there is a hierarchy of preferred agents to make factual determinations.   
With the introduction of the saiban-in, the trial court and its determinations 
as to what occurred belongs to lay participants in the adjudication process.   
Applying the same standard of review to judicial and saiban-in findings of 
fact on appeal renders superfluous lay participants’ input and undermines the 
very contribution that lay participation was intended to make.  As a result, 
the practice seriously undermines the goals of the saiban-in seido.166  
Although judges seem to be respecting lay participants’ input now, the 
reviewability of saiban-in found facts on appeal threatens to significantly 
dilute the respect that judges give to lay assessors and their participation 
during deliberations over time.  Allowing appellate circumvention of lay 
input increases the ease with which panel judges can slip into listless 
explanations of law and procedure to panelists, in the hope that their 
guidance will equip them to participate.  However, they ultimately rely on 
the court of appeals to reverse if the laypersons’ findings are improper.  The 
fact that a court on koso appeal may replace the contribution of lay 
                                                      
163  See Saikō Saibanshō [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 13, 2012, 2011 (A) 757, 66 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHŌ KEIJI 
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] sec. II.1 (Shiraki, J., concurring) (parentheses added), available at http://www.courts.
go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=1142  
164  Levin, supra note 74, at 212. 
165  Id. at 213. 
166  It should be noted that although Judgment 1785 was decided in 2007, this case would still have 
been tried by a single judge or panel because it does not qualify as a serious offense under the Saiban-in 
Act.  Anderson & Saint, supra note 6, at 236. 
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participants in the judicial system affects the amount of respect judges afford 
that contribution and, over the long run, the respect such judges afford the 
saiban-in members themselves. 
The pre-existing procedural structure into which saiban-in panels 
have been placed may be likened to wineskins, and the invigorating 
influence of the lay public by way of the saiban-in to new wine poured into 
them.  Unfortunately, the pre-saiban-in practices that allow judges to reverse 
lay participants’ findings are like old wineskins.  The old procedure is 
inappropriate for the new influence.  Just as the old wineskins are prone to 
crack and break, allowing the wine to leak out, the old procedure risks the 
spoliation of the saiban-in’s potential in the justice system.  To enjoy 
meaningful exchange between the public and the judiciary and produce a 
justice system that enjoys a ‘popular base,’ it is essential that professional 
judges regard the contribution of laypersons on saiban-in panels highly, with 
the knowledge that the panel’s contribution will have a lasting weight on the 
particular case.  In order to preserve the integrity of laypersons’ 
contributions to the justice system, and for trial judges to continue fostering 
a meaningful exchange of ideas and values in deliberations, it is essential 
that saiban-in findings not be replaced by professional judges on appeal. 
IV. A DEFERENTIAL STANDARD TO REPLACE SAIBAN-IN FINDINGS IS 
INSUFFICIENT TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE 
JUSTICE SYSTEM OVER THE LONG RUN 
A.  A 2012 Decision by the Supreme Court of Japan Requires Judges to 
Give Trial Courts’ Findings of Fact Deference 
In 2012, the Supreme Court of Japan decided 2011 (A) 757, a 
judgment concerning the meaning of the errors in fact finding provided for 
in Article 382 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.167  Article 382 of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure allows parties to appeal on errors of factual 
findings.168  This decision, made three years after the introduction of saiban-
in panels, is a step in the right direction towards insulating saiban-in 
findings from appellate replacement.  However, it fails to guarantee the 
deference necessary for meaningful exchange between the public and the 
judiciary over the long run.  A thorough review of the case is necessary to 
                                                      
167  See Saikō Saibanshō [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 13, 2012, 2011 (A) 757, 66 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHŌ KEIJI 
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ], available at http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=1142. 
168  KEIS SOSHŌHŌ [KEISOHŌ] [C. CRIM. PRO.] 2007, art. 382 (Japan) available at 
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?ft=3&re=02&dn=1&ia=03&x=37&y=18&bu=16&ky
=&page=8.  
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explain what the Supreme Court of Japan accomplished through its decision, 
and what it failed to do. 
In Judgment 2011 (A) 757, Japanese customs officials found nearly 
1000 grams of drugs hidden in “chocolate cans” in a man’s169 bag as he 
entered Japan through an international airport.170  This man also had five 
foreign passports in his possession—some of them forged. 171   The 
prosecution charged the man with transporting illegal drugs into Japan by 
conspiring with others.172  The main issue at trial was whether or not the 
defendant knew that the chocolate cans had drugs in them.173  He argued he 
had agreed to transfer stolen passports for a fee, and that he had been given 
the chocolate cans as a gift to be given to the recipient (the “recipient”) of 
the passports.174 
The trial court—a saiban-in panel—acquitted the defendant after it 
determined that he was unaware of the drugs.  In the opinion of the panel, 
the court found that the defendant could not have observed the drugs 
because the cans had not been opened.  The court so reasoned despite the 
fact that the defendant had been concerned that drugs might be inside the 
cans, and that the intended recipient of the passports was a known drug 
liaison.  The court noted that the defendant had an alternative explanation for 
coming to Japan that was substantiated by the forged passports.  
Furthermore, the court stated that, although the cans were heavy,175 the 
defendant had no chance to compare them to others.  It also found that while 
the defendant had made some inconsistent statements, they could be 
explained by a desire to get through customs quickly.  Moreover, the court 
noted that the defendant’s arguments were corroborated by the fact that the 
cans looked normal, as they were placed at the top of the bag (and not the 
bottom, like the passports).  Lastly, the court stated that the defendant made 
no attempt to delay examination of the cans, even though he did attempt to 
delay examination of the passports.176  
The prosecutor appealed on the grounds that the trial court’s factual 
findings were incorrect.177  On appeal, the koso court disagreed with the trial 
                                                      
169  The English translation does not indicate the gender of the defendant; for purposes of convenience 
the author refers to the defendant as a man. 
170  Saikō Saibanshō [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 13, 2012, 2011 (A) no. 757, 66 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHŌ KEIJI 
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ], sec. II.2, available at http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=1142. 
171  Id. at sec. II.2(5). 
172  Id. at sec. II.1. 
173  Id. at sec. II.3(1). 
174  Id. at sec. II.2(6). 
175  Id. at sec. II.1(6). 
176  See id. at sec. II.2-3. 
177  Id. 
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court’s conclusions.  The koso court found the defendant’s story 
unconvincing for several reasons: he changed his statements several times, 
he failed to mention the forged passports, he was not confused or resistant 
when arrested, and he failed to call the recipient of the passports at trial to 
corroborate his story.  Instead, he attempted to conceal the relationship.  
Finally, the appeals court found it unlikely that the defendant would not have 
opened the cans to check for drugs when he had admitted to expressing 
concern that there might have been drugs inside.  The koso appeals court 
reversed the judgment and found the defendant guilty.178  The defendant 
appealed to the Supreme Court of Japan. 
The Supreme Court began its analysis by describing the context of 
appellate review: 
 
[T]he court of second instance (the koso appeals court) should 
review the judgment in first instance (the trial court) . . . rather 
than examin[e] the case itself from the same standpoint [of] the 
court of first instance.179 
 
The Court explained that this is because the trial court “directly hear[s] 
arguments and examine[s] evidence and . . . hold[s] these procedures 
orally.” 180   The Court emphasized that the trial court finds facts 
“comprehensively by directly examining the witnesses concerned 
[and] . . . determining the credibility of the statements based on their attitude 
in giving testimony.”181  The Court specifically highlighted the significance 
of lay participation in this process: 
 
This [above mentioned approach] shall apply more 
appropriately to a situation where the judges who are to make a 
judgment on the case are thoroughly required to directly hear 
arguments and examine evidence and to hold these procedures 
orally in the first instance upon the introduction of the [s]aiban-
in (Lay Judge) system.182 
 
Finally, before delving into the appellate court’s opinion and reasons for it, 
the Court laid out the specific standard of review that it would apply to the 
                                                      
178  Id. 
179  Id. at sec. II.4(1). 
180  Id. 
181  Id.  
182  Id. at sec. II.4(1). 
414 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 24 NO. 2  
 
koso court’s determination: 
 
[T]he court of first instance (the trial court) determined the 
indirect facts [indicating knowledge] . . . were insufficient to 
presume that the accused was aware of the existence of illegal 
drugs.  Accordingly . . . the (trial court) judgment . . . cannot be 
found to contain errors in fact finding unless it is specifically 
demonstrated that such judgment in first instance (the trial 
court) was unreasonable in light of the rules of logic or rules of 
thumb, etc.   From this standpoint, we will review the judgment 
in prior instance (the appellate decision).183 
 
The Court then moved to address each of the appellate court’s four 
findings.  The Supreme Court first stated that although the koso court found 
that the defendant’s story was unreliable because it had changed, such 
change “can be regarded as a circumstance, in general, to . . . abate the 
credibility of the accused’s statement,”184 and whether or not the defendant’s 
final explanation can be rejected “should be determined in a comprehensive 
manner.”185  In response to the appellate court’s findings on the other three 
points, the Court stated that the defendant’s behavior and explanations did 
not necessarily render his story unreliable, deferring to the trial court’s 
determination.  The Supreme Court of Japan ultimately concluded that the 
court of appeal erred by failing to “sufficiently demonstrate[] that the 
holdings of the judgment in first instance [were] unreasonable.”186 
The Supreme Court of Japan’s affirmation of the trial court’s special 
position to assess creditability and weigh evidence is a strong step in the 
right direction towards respecting and shielding lay participants’ 
contributions to criminal justice.187  This case is significant because the 
Court deferred to the trial court’s determination, and specifically referred to 
the saiban-in.  The Court also invoked the values of “orality and 
                                                      
183  Id. sec. II.4(2) (parentheses added). 
184  Id. sec. II.4(3). 
185  Id. sec. II.4(2). 
186  Id. sec. II.4(4). 
187  See, e.g., Saikō Saibanshō [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 20, 2014, 2012 (A) 797, 68 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHŌ KEIJI 
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ], available at http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=1225 (invoking 2011 
(A) 757 and reversing a koso court decision that had reversed a trial court decision on grounds that the koso 
court failed to “sufficiently demonstrate[] that the findings in the judgment in first instance (the trial court) 
were unreasonable”). But see Saikō Saibanshō [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 10, 2014, 2012 (A) 744, 68 SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHŌ KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ], available at http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=122; 
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 21, 2013, 2012 (A) 724, 67 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHŌ KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ], 
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=1206. 
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directness,” 188 which were discussed at length by the JSRC in its 
recommendations, and affirmed the special position of the trial court in 
fulfilling these values.189  Additionally, the standard the Court used to reject 
the koso appeal court’s decision demonstrates the significance of this case.  
After it discussed the value of a comprehensive evaluation of the evidence, 
the Court rejected the appellate court’s conclusion that the defendant’s 
explanation was false because he had changed his statements.  It rejected this 
conclusion in part because the appellate court did not make its 
“determin[ation] in a comprehensive manner.”190  Further, it noted that the 
appellate court did not “tak[e] into consideration other specific 
circumstances in th[e] case.”191  As the Court had already explained, “fact 
finding is expected to be made comprehensively” on the saiban-in level.192  
Ultimately, the court rejected the koso appeals court’s finding because it 
failed to “sufficiently demonstrate[] that the holdings of the judgment in first 
instance (the trial court) [were] unreasonable.”193  As a result, the koso 
appeals courts must demonstrate that the saiban-in found facts are 
unreasonable in order to reject them. 
It is necessary to point out that the decision does not prohibit appellate 
courts from finding new facts on appeal.  The Court’s laudatory language 
about the trial level aside, the decision merely adds an additional hoop 
through which judges must leap in order to replace facts.  The decision 
requires appellate judges to “specifically demonstrate that the findings of the 
judgment in first instance are unreasonable.”194  This standard departs from 
the near de novo review enjoyed by appellate courts in the past, but fails to 
comprehensively protect the public’s contribution.  The barrier for appellate 
judges to find new facts should be higher in order to effect this protection.  
Justice Shiraki stated as much in his concurrence.195  It is insufficient, he 
noted, that appellate courts must now consider whether or not the trial 
court’s credibility determinations are unreasonable and then demonstrate it 
specifically.196  According to Justice Shiraki, the presumption should be in 
                                                      
188 JUSTICE SYS. REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 59. 
189 Saikō Saibanshō [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 13, 2012, 2011 (A) 757, 66 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHŌ KEIJI HANREISHŪ 
[KEISHŪ] sec. II.4, available at http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=1142. 
190 Id. sec. II.4(3). 
191  Id. sec. II.4(3). 
192  Id. sec. II.4(1). 
193  Id. sec. II.4(4) (parenthesis added). 
194  Id. 
195 See Saikō Saibanshō [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 13, 2012, 2011 (A) 757, 66 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHŌ KEIJI 
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] sec. II.1 (Shiraki, J., concurring), available at http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en
/detail?id=1142  
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favor of the saiban-in: “I would like to point out the importance [of] tak[ing] 
a stance to consider the determination of the court of first instance as 
acceptable unless it is unreasonable.”197  A standard like the one Justice 
Shiraki proposes would better protect the saibain-in’s democratic exchange 
between the public and the judiciary. 
B.  Deferential Standards for Replacing Saiban-in Factual Findings Are 
Insufficient to Protect Meaningful Exchange Between the Public and 
the Judiciary in the Long Run 
Even if the Supreme Court of Japan instituted a new and highly 
deferential standard of review for saiban-in findings, the long-term 
sustainability of such a standard would remain uncertain because judicial 
standards of review are vulnerable to deterioration.  While every policy 
maker must accept the limited lifespan and temporal applicability of any 
new rule or policy, it is easy to imagine a situation in which an initial 
attempt to establish a heightened standard of review is followed diligently in 
the early years, but over time is diluted by considerations of efficiency and 
the desire to make things right in the immediate case. 
If a heightened standard of review towards lay participants’ role in the 
judiciary in Japan eroded over time, it would not be the first time that such 
erosion took place in a modern judiciary.  For example, summary judgment 
proceedings in the United States were intended to allow civil litigants to 
avoid a jury trial when no rational juror could find for the plaintiff.198  It was 
originally intended to be a measure employed by judges sparingly;199 when 
the proceedings became available to federal judges, they were wary of 
granting it. 200   Over time (and after the Supreme Court clarified the 
standard), summary judgment came to “stand[] alongside trial and settlement 
as a pillar of [the American] system.”201  Modern federal jurisprudence is 
“largely the product of summary judgment in civil cases.”202  Strikingly, this 
erosion was able to take place in the United States despite constitutional 
protections for trial by jury.203 
                                                      
197  Id.  
198  See FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
199  See Patricia M. Wald, Federal Practice And Procedure Symposium Honoring Charles Alan 
Wright: Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897 (1998). 
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Judgment, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1759, 1762 (2010). 
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Presumably legitimate motives have fueled the desire to grant more 
summary judgments in the United States—efficiency and the desire to afford 
justice more immediately to litigants—rather than have cases draw out 
needlessly.204  Similarly, if a highly deferential “no rational juror” standard 
was adopted in Japan, pure motives would urge courts of appeal judges to 
find that a saiban-in panel had misinterpreted or misunderstood the evidence 
when a professional judge believed a different result would have been more 
equitable.    
V. NEW WINESKINS FOR NEW WINE: APPELLATE JUDGES SHOULD NOT BE 
ALLOWED TO REPLACE THE SAIBAN-IN’S FACTUAL FINDINGS ON APPEAL 
Patching old wineskins is a short-term fix for a long-term problem.   
Encouraging judges to give heightened deference to saiban-in factual 
findings, or enforcing a heightened standard of review, is well intentioned 
but insufficient to guarantee judicial regard for lay participants’ input in the 
long term.  Deference is prone to deterioration, and higher standards can be 
avoided.  To ensure that lay assessors’ decisions have the intended effect on 
the cases they decide, and to ensure that the saiban-in seido makes an 
enduring contribution to the criminal justice system in the long run, the 
Supreme Court of Japan should prohibit appellate courts from replacing 
facts on koso appeal.    
It should be noted that the decision to maintain koso appeals was 
made deliberately.  Even while stating “the relevant laws should be modified 
to . . . ensure autonomous and meaningful participation by saiban-in,”205 the 
JSRC ultimately failed to recommend banning koso appeals.206  The Lay 
Assessor/Penal Matters Study Investigation Committee also considered, but 
ultimately rejected, a number of options, including: completely barring 
factual review on appeal; allowing factual review on appeal but requiring an 
annulment of the judgment (and likely a retrial); and incorporating lay 
participation on appeal.207  It is possible that the JSRC and Investigation 
Committee maintained the koso appeal because reviewability of factual 
findings on appeal is common to civil law systems, or because German 
criminal procedure specifically allows parties to do so.  In Germany, 
however, reversals on factual grounds must be tried before a new panel so 
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that the inviolability of the public’s influence is preserved.208  It may also be 
possible that the JSRC, and especially the Investigation Committee, 
maintained koso appeals because banning them would be asking too much of 
the judiciary.  Additionally, the JSRC may have felt that incorporating lay 
participation on the trial level is a decision properly made by way of political 
processes, and that changes to appellate review and procedure so deep 
beneath the surface of the justice system would upset the independence of 
the judiciary. 
The Supreme Court of Japan is in an ideal position to prohibit judicial 
replacement of saiban-in factual findings on appeal because of its legitimacy 
and power as the highest court in the land.  Barring appellate courts from 
replacing facts on koso appeal would not require the creation of any new 
appellate process because it would not require the promulgation of any new 
laws.  Appellate courts would still be able to find error in saiban-in fact 
finding, but, when such error were to be found, the court would no longer be 
able to independently replace facts.  Instead, the koso court would have to 
either find the error harmless or remand the case.  Although this change 
would ultimately require more judicial expenditure in the form of time and 
cost for the cases that were remanded, no changes in the current 
infrastructure would be necessary to effectuate the change.  Furthermore, 
knowledge that a finding of error on the saiban-in level would require a new 
trial would inhibit many judges from otherwise finding an error—thereby 
subconsciously raising the standard for finding factual error. 
For saiban-in trials, the Supreme Court of Japan should discontinue 
the practice whereby appellate judges replace saiban-in found facts on koso 
appeal.  Doing so is essential to ensuring that laypersons’ input on particular 
cases is safeguarded and that meaningful exchange between the public and 
the judiciary continues to occur into the future when the novelty and fanfare 
surrounding the new system wear off.  In order to effectuate the goals of the 
millennium justice reforms and to allow lay participants to “take part 
autonomously and meaningfully in deciding trials,”209 the Supreme Court of 
Japan should prohibit courts of appeal from replacing facts found by saiban-
in panels during trial. 
 
                                                      
208  See Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative Analysis and 
Proposals for Reform, 48 Ala. L. Rev. 441, 460 (1997); see also supra note 70 at 213. 
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